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Bio-Ethics from Image of God and Soul
Doug Kennard, Ph. D., Biblical Studies Department, Bryan College, Dayton, TN 37321
Abstract
Faced with the near unanimity of biblical anthropology among biblical theology (Botterweck 
& Ringgren, 1974–2006; Brown, 1975; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1964–1976; 
VanGemeren, 1997), I propose an analysis of the biblical words and concepts, focusing on: (1) “image 
of God” and (2) “soul.” This approach results in a functionalism, which I call a multi-faceted unity. I 
propose to extend these biblical theology categories into the field of bio-ethics for implications. This 
approach is in contrast to some Christian bio-ethicists who start from the field of philosophy or biology 
and tack some devotional elements of the Bible on the rafters of their view.
(1) Image of God means “a representation of God” showing that God rules here (Wolff, 1974, 
pp. 160-161; Tell Fekheriye inscription 1, 12, 15–16; 4Q504 fragment 8, lines 4–6). God sets the purpose of 
His image to finitely rule under God’s sovereignty. As images of God we humans are to play god in bio-
ethics, doing miniature acts of sovereignty under the Sovereign God (Genesis 1:26–28; 5:1, 3; 9:6; James 
3:9). 
This legitimates humans attempting prevention and recovery means like: ways of controlling pests (for 
example, serpents), aids to diminish pain in child birth, pesticides and herbicides, fertilization of crops, 
genetically modified food, inoculations, drug and surgery treatment, AID, in vitro-fertilization, stem cell 
treatment, gene therapy, and cloning. Such an image of God concept identifies the theoretically 
permissible even though I recognize methodologically ethical principles raised elsewhere in the paper 
bring certain restrictions.  
In ruling the creation, anything is permitted provided it: (a) Is not excluded by God’s command 
(Genesis 3:17–19; Romans 14:10–12). (b) Fits within God’s design parameters, and is (c) actively engaged 
in for the Lord’s glory (Romans 14:6–12). (d) Helps and does not hinder (Romans 14:13–15:6). (e) Fits within 
an affirming conscience, rather than violating one’s conscience (a New Covenant thing; Romans 14:5, 
22–23).
(2) The biblical concept of soul entails a wholistic meaning of “complete living and willing being” in 
a non-microbial pre-modern manner (for example, Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10). Thus, soul means 
that animals have certain privileges against extremes of bio-ethical abuse. 
Biblically bio-ethically humans have a right to life. Those who kill a fetus are then culpable of murder 
and were to be killed by capital punishment (Genesis 4:1, 25; Exodus 21:22–24; Psalms 51:5; 139:13–15; 
Revelation 6:9).  
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Introduction
Bio-ethics as a field is dominated by philosophers 
and biologists using philosophical assumptions and 
categories. Since God created humans and provided 
a revelational description of us, this biblicism should 
reframe our conceptuality of humanity so as to fund 
bio-ethics from biblical thought forms, from start to 
finish. I propose to present an analysis of the words 
and concepts articulated in Old and New Testament 
literature that address the nature of a human. The 
conclusions presented from this analysis will be used 
to make a presentation of an integrated model of a 
human. I propose to then extend these biblical theology 
categories into the field of bio-ethics to unpack their 
bio-ethical implications. 
Following this approach results in a functionalism 
(because of the redundant descriptions of wholistic 
humanity in the model), which I call a multi-faceted 
unity (of: image of God, soul, spirit, body, heart, mind, 
will, and conscience). However, the concreteness of 
especially Hebrew descriptive words could also be 
appealed to in claiming this model as an ontological 
model because it is describing the way we are from 
the biblical perspective, and so we should think about 
ourselves in this manner (Kennard, 1992). This 
means that this view should be thought as ontological 
and functionalist both, even though this is a novel 
way for philosophy to conceive of humanity. However, 
part of the point of this paper is to call philosophy and 
other human disciplines back to being reconfigured 
by the Word of God and biblical theology.  
For example, within Christendom there are many 
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views of the nature of the human being. Among the most 
prominent are two views rooted in Platonism which 
have had long-standing traditions in Christianity. 
Dichotomists, following the Epistle to Diognetus 
(1964), make a distinction between the material and 
immaterial parts of a human, reflective of Plato’s soul 
and body concepts. Theologians adhering to this view 
argue that soul and spirit are used interchangeably, 
whereas trichotomists, following Justin Martyr, point 
out that soul and spirit are distinct (Justin Martyr, 
1949, Apol. 1.29). Such a trichotomy view is reflective 
of the neo-platonic trichotomy view of: spirit, soul, 
and body. In the twentieth century, additional views 
of humanity emerged including advocates of a holistic 
model. For example, one holistic model in the wake 
of Gestalt psychology maintains that the person is 
greater than the sum of his parts.  
In contrast to this, biologists define humans either 
by comparison to animal properties and traits, or 
if they are Christians through a devotional lens of 
Jesus’ disciples. For example, Institute for Creation 
Research biologist Daniel Criswell defined humans 
and proposed an ethic that identified that the core 
trait of humanity was to be a servant in the pattern 
of: (1) a non-alpha male from a herd or pack and (2) 
Jesus’ disciple (Criswell, 2006, pp. 1–4). With the 
proliferation of widely divergent views there is a 
real danger of the disciplines of ethics and theology 
fragmenting into different Wittgensteinian language 
games unable to meaningfully communicate between 
them. Is such a postmodern option a way to leave this 
discipline? How should a wise Christian choose among 
all these views of humanness? To be sure, whatever 
model one chooses, it brings with it a worldview 
which is indebted to the philosophy upon which it is 
built. The author rejects bio-ethics built within these 
alternative world views as significantly flawed, for 
they will insulate the advocate from arriving at a 
consistent biblicism.
My approach is in contrast to the perspectives 
provided by philosophy, psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, and biology. Those disciplines give 
answers consistent with their worldviews and the 
methodologies dominant in these approaches. If an 
evangelical is working in these disciplines, often 
the extent of Christian integration is hanging a few 
biblical proof texts on the rafters. When Christians 
extend their bilingual beliefs from these disciplines 
into the field of bio-ethics then they become a parody 
of Star Trek: timidly going where everyone has gone 
before.   
The author suggests instead using the approach 
of the biblical theology movement, that a Christian 
functional model of humanity start first with the 
biblical text and then work out the implications for 
bio-ethics. In the second half of the twentieth century 
within the descriptive biblical theology movement 
a model of the human being as a multifaceted 
unity gained dominance in the discipline. The near 
unanimity of biblical theologians embracing this 
model can be seen by the treatment in the theological 
wordbooks (Botterweck & Ringgren, 1974–2006; 
Brown, 1975; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle 
& Friedrich, 1964–76; VanGemeren, 1997) and by the 
scholarly descriptions of humanity from specialized 
biblical theologies (Dunn, 1998, pp. 51–78; Wolff, 
1974), which corroborate the word studies of this 
paper. This near unanimity was bemoaned in the 
open question time and in the paper by Jeffrey Boyd 
at the Wheaton Theology Conference in 1997 focusing 
on the integration of psychology and theology. At this 
conference, Kennard and Holmes championed this 
near unanimous view as a framework for integrating 
psychology and theology (Kennard & Holmes, 
1997). Boyd’s concern was the loss of spirituality as 
behaviorists reduce humans to programmed matter in 
appeals to a wholistic view of soul. These descriptive 
biblical theologians are not arguing for what some 
behaviorists claim, for the behaviorists selectively 
appeal to a small part of biblical theology research to 
support their behaviorist agenda. So, Boyd’s concern 
should be alleviated by the profound degree of 
spirituality retained within the view presented here. 
Faced with a variety of psychological, philosophical 
and theological models, and the near unanimity 
of biblical anthropology among descriptive biblical 
theology, how is the Christian to understand the 
nature of humanness? I propose to follow the biblical 
theologians through an analysis of the words and 
concepts articulated in Old Testament and New 
Testament literature that address the nature of a 
human. The conclusions presented from this analysis 
will be used to make a presentation of an integrated 
model of a human. I propose to then extend these 
biblical theology categories into the field of bio-ethics 
to unpack their bio-ethical implications. 
This method provides biblical grounding and 
thought forms to warrant the design and revealed 
framework for bio-ethics. From this approach we can 
with real warrant, boldly go where few have gone 
before, because God leads the narrow route through 
the galaxy of bio-ethical issues. The focus of this 
paper will be on the ethical issues that emerge from a 
biblical anthropology of image of God and soul.
Image of God
A range of traditional options identify how several 
theologies understand humans to be made in the 
image of God. For example, Irenaeus proposed “image 
of God” to describe reason and free will, while “likeness 
of God” he identified as the supernatural endowment 
through the Spirit (Irenaeus, 1995, 3.23.5 and 5.6.1). 
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Aquinas follows Irenaeus view identifying the imago 
dei as retained at the Fall but the likeness is lost at 
the Fall (Aquinas, 1952, 1.93.4). In contrast, Martin 
Luther and John Calvin identified “image of God” as 
identical to “likeness of God” in that both affirm the 
ability to reason and original righteousness (Calvin, 
n.d., 1:1; Luther, 1958, 1: 60–62). Both Reformers saw 
these qualities as significantly marred through the 
Fall. Others followed their lead, such as Emil Brunner 
who took “image of God” as a symbol for “moral 
uprightness or righteousness of God” (Brunner, 1947, 
p. 388). In contrast, Karl Barth identified “image of 
God” is essentially the relationality of humans that 
permits relationship with God and fellow humans 
after the pattern of the divine relationships within 
the Trinity (Barth, 1936–1969, 3/2:196). Additionally, 
Thomas Torrance and G. C. Berkouwer identify “image 
of God” as “the focal point in the interrelationships 
between God and the universe” (Berkouwer, 1962, 
pp. 87–89, 179, 197–198; Torrance, 1981, p. 129). 
None of these traditional views are how the Bible or 
the descriptive biblical theology movement uses the 
term of “image of God.”
The concept of humankind as the “image of God” 
is first introduced in the creation account in Genesis. 
As God creates man, He formulates an image of 
Himself (Genesis 1:26–28). The words for “image” 
(s lmnw/       ,          ) and “likeness” (dmtnw/     , 
   )      ) state that characteristics attributed to God 
in this passage are reflected in a human.  There is no 
distinction between the two words; they are totally 
interchangeable (Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980, 
1:192). In this Genesis 1 instance, Eugene Merrill 
clarifies that the   (“in”) is best understood as the 
“beth of identity” and parallel to the   (“according to”) 
in indicating functionality (Alexander & Baker, 2003, 
pp. 443–444). That is, “image and likeness of 
God” mean that humans function in the role as 
representation and representative of God.  
This account introduces humans as a 
representation of God on earth. In the ancient 
Near East, kings would erect images of themselves 
indicating regions that were appropriately within 
their domain. For example, Ramesses II had his 
image hewn out of rock at the mouth of the nahr el-
kelb on the Mediterranean north of Beirut, indicating 
he ruled this area (Tell Fekheriye inscription 1, 12, 
15–16 in Millard & Bordreuil, 1982, p. 137; 4Q504 
fragment 8, lines 4–6 in Wise, Abegg, & Cook, 
2005, p. 526; VanGemeren, 1997, 1:969–970; Wolff, 
1974, pp. 160–161). Therefore, as God’s image, man 
indicates by his very presence that God rules the 
earth. This emphasis of the greatness of God’s creative 
and sovereign power reflects the emphasis of the first 
literary unit (Genesis 1:1–2:3) as it polemics other 
ancient Near East cosmologies.
Image of God indicates humans are God’s 
representative on earth; man pictures God as both 
sovereign ruler and creator (Alexander & Baker, 
2003, pp. 442, 444–445; Apocrypha: Sir. 17.3–4; 
Wis. 2.23; Brown, 1975, 2:287; Kittel & Friedrich, 
1964–76, 2:392; Freedman & Simon, 1977: Gen. Rab. 
8.10; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980, 2:768; Neusner, 
1988: b.Sanh. 38b; m ’Abot 3.14; b. Meg. 9a; 28a; 
VanGemeren, 1997, 1:969; von Rad, 1962, 1:146; Wolff, 
1974, pp. 159–165;). Thus, images of God are designed 
by God to rule the creation (Genesis 1:26). To help 
facilitate this ruling, the images of God are blessed to 
both reproduce themselves and thereby facilitate this 
ruling of the created order (Genesis 1:28). “Filling the 
earth” connects these two themes, showing the extent 
of man’s procreative power and making it possible for 
him to rule. Creation and rule require a male and a 
female in the human realm. Persons are individually 
God’s image and as a married pair the couple is God’s 
image. Not that relationality is meant by image but 
that individually we humans contribute toward 
ruling and that married pairs also contribute toward 
ruling (being fruitful, multiplying to fill the earth so 
subduing and ruling can occur). God’s image as one, 
yet plural, hints at the majestic creator character of 
Elohim (Kennard, 2002, pp. 87–89). From the chaotic 
images of formlessness that begin the passage, God 
shows his goodness through purposefully designing 
creation and then humans in His image. Humans are 
to bring this creation under our control, which would 
include remaking it purposefully for the ends we 
think are best under our stewardship to God. 
Genesis goes on to develop the idea that God’s image 
included being His son, fitted by a loving Father with 
an appropriate situation, work, life and marriage 
(Genesis 2:23–24; 5:1–3; Luke 3:38; Alexander & 
Baker, 2003, pp. 442; Instruction of Merikare 1.106 
in Prichard, 1969, pp. 414–418). The few additional 
references to humans as God’s image indicate that 
this image continues beyond the fall (Genesis 5:1, 3; 
9:6; James 3:9) though dragged through futility and 
death as a result of sin. 
In contrast to a creation-based view of human 
as image of God, the image of Christ is a future 
representation of Christian humans in their 
glorification. Jesus Christ in His incarnation comes 
in the image of God, but upon completing His 
work, He was highly exalted (2 Corinthians 4:4; 
Colossians 10:15; Philippians 2:6–11). As a result, the 
Christian is not merely having his damaged image 
of God repaired but is also being made into a more 
exalted image of the glorified Son of God (Romans 
8:29–30; 1 Corinthians 15:49; 2 Corinthians 3:18; 
4:4; Philippians 3:21). In fact, the Christian’s fallen 
condition will be transformed into a higher state than 
that of Adam before the fall. 
  ∋ίκóνα 
óμοίωσιν
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The concept of “image of God” has implications 
for the individual as he lives out life. Terms such 
as sovereignty are associated with the concept 
and indicate the responsibility the first human 
inhabitants were given for the world in which 
they lived. The terms for “subdue” and “rule” 
                                             are very forceful, encouraging utilization 
and dominance of the creation by humans (Genesis 
1:26, 28). Such forceful words, are used elsewhere 
in instances of conquest and rape, implying that the 
created world will resist some of our rule (Leviticus 
26:17; Numbers 32:22, 29; Nehemiah 5:5; Jeremiah 
34:11, 16; Genesis 3:1–5 shows first resistance). This 
is especially the case once the creation is subjected 
to futility by the oracle of judgment in response to 
the fall of humans (Genesis 3:14–19; Romans 8:20). 
However, humans are to provide the structures and 
guidelines for co-existing and engaging with their 
natural environment. In this sense, our responsibility 
to nature included those encompassed by that of a 
fiduciary or curator (Genesis 2:15–19). The original 
inhabitants provided organization to diminish chaos 
and promote an environment in which the needs of 
all are observed. Humans are to nurture nature. 
Both before the Fall and after the Fall, the original 
inhabitants provided organization to diminish chaos 
and promote an environment in which the needs 
of all are observed. This is evident in the naming, 
organizing and agricultural work humans were to 
accomplish. This structure provided an atmosphere 
in which the inherent potential of both human beings 
and nature itself could be actualized. As images and 
sons of God, humans are to play god in bio-ethics, 
not be God (the Sovereign), but do miniature acts of 
sovereignty within the stewardship which has been 
delegated to us by the Sovereign God. In the same 
way as our kids play house and army men, so in our 
stewardship we are to play god in bringing control to 
the area of biology.
Anything that is not biblically excluded, we have 
free range to conceptually plan and explore for the 
potential gain that we can bring to the creation. 
Such subduing control does not control all factors 
for God remains sovereign over our stewardship 
under Him. The causalities are best understood as 
a divine-human compatibilism in which both God 
and humans choose and implement everything that 
comes to pass (Genesis 4:1; Acts 2:23; Kennard, 2002, 
pp. 135–166, 185–204). Thus we do not violate God’s 
sovereignty by our humanly responsible attempts 
to subdue and rule the creation. This legitimates 
humans attempting prevention and recovery means 
like: ways of controlling pests (for example, serpents), 
aids to diminish pain in child-birth, pesticides and 
herbicides, fertilization of crops, genetically modified 
food, inoculations, drug and surgery treatment, 
AID, in vitro-fertilization (especially if all fertilized 
eggs are used to try to implant), stem cell treatment, 
gene therapy, and reproductive cloning (Cole-Turner, 
1997, pp. 149–151). Such an image of God concept 
identifies the theoretically permissible even though I 
recognize methodologically ethical principles raised 
elsewhere in the paper bring certain restrictions. 
For example, I recognize that embryonic stem cell 
research should not destroy the embryo (because it 
is life) but may be possible without such destruction, 
however pragmatically may not be therapeutically 
productive unless the problem of tumor production is 
significantly diminished. Furthermore, a clone does 
not become a substitute for a person, nor should be 
insurance for a person (contrary to the movie, The 
Island), but such a clone is a whole new image of God. 
That is, cloning only provides a biological duplicate to 
progress through a developmental process that will 
at least in some respect be different from the original. 
Nature provides possibilities, whereas nurture 
realizes some of those possibilities.  
Thus genetic determinism is too limited an idea 
to reflect what biblical divine-human compatibilism 
entails. In fact, with only 20,000–25,000 protein-
coding genes this is probably too few to determine all 
aspects of our life and destiny (International Human 
Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2004, pp. 931–945). 
Furthermore, if one could methodologically develop 
filtering to recognize cystic fibrosis or Down syndrome, 
genetic therapy of the zygote would not be forcing 
genes upon the new individual (albeit, with parental 
consent) for these genes would be utilized in the early 
creation process making the new individual who he 
is in creation. Nurture, of course, would then develop 
the given of these genetic possibilities. Likewise, a 
clone and a genetically manipulated fertilized egg 
is a new image of God in a different situation than 
that of the original. This is evident in recognizing 
observable differences among identical twins who 
occupy the same womb. The nurturing environment 
will significantly affect the development of this new 
image of God. The cloned or genetically aided image 
of God will live life within the same stewardship 
as other images of God: responsible, accountable, 
answerable, praised or judged.  
Of course, the fact that we can and should explore 
ways of controlling the creation does not guarantee 
funding or ease in obtaining resources. The utility of 
greater gain for the greater good would argue for the 
public funding to pursue those health needs which 
would accomplish the most societal good. Communal 
oversight helps to: (1) alleviate potential problems, 
(2) limit violating societal conscience, and (3) rule 
creation responsibly. For example, in the United 
States genetically modified food is not much of an 
issue probably because of the oversight brought about 
   
47Bio-Ethics from Image of God and Soul
by the Food and Drug Administration (“Talk of the 
Nation: Science Friday,” 2005). This was aided by the 
FDA defining genetically modified food as “essentially 
equivalent” to the natural. Perhaps something like 
the FDA could help relieve the international fears as 
well. Furthermore, personal funding could be utilized 
to support those concerns which an individual is 
passionate about. Provided resources and means 
were available, such expressions of control are to 
be encouraged. As images of God, we each have 
responsibility to reason and obtain consent of the 
responsible parties in pursuing our control of part 
of the creation. Of course, the obtaining of resources 
does not provide license to violate ethics (for example, 
abortion to obtain stem cells will be shown to be a 
violation of biblical ethics).
To facilitate this control of the creation, human 
beings possess cognitive abilities that enable self-
reflective thought and the ability to assess, learn from 
past experience, anticipate future contingencies, and 
to choose purposefully to accomplish desired ends 
(Kennard, 1999, pp. 35–70). These capacities make 
him uniquely qualified for the task of stewardship. 
For example, Adam was given the responsibility of 
naming the creatures in the garden and identifying 
a partner for himself (Genesis 2:20). The roles and 
responsibilities inherent within humanness, such as 
cultivation and care, suggest that the truly human 
individual comprehends the ecological balance of 
nature and interacts with it in a manner that respects 
the place of all things created. This individual 
understands that the project of true humanness 
is increased when the potential of all nature is 
encouraged. Thus to thwart the actualization of the 
least of created things hinders the peace (shalom) 
intended for all. 
In ruling the creation, anything is permitted 
provided it is: (1) Not excluded by God’s command, 
like judging someone with a different opinion or 
practice (Romans 14:3–10, 13). That is, don’t disobey 
God or He could judge you (Genesis 3:17–19; Romans 
14:10–12). (2) Anything is permitted provided it fits 
within the priority of the design parameters and is 
(3) actively engaged in for the Lord’s glory (Romans 
14:6–12). (4) Anything wise is permitted, in that it 
helps and does not hinder (Romans 14:13–15:6). (5) 
Anything is permitted that fits within an affirming 
conscience, rather than violating one’s conscience (a 
New Covenant thing; Romans 14:5, 22–23).
To facilitate the image of God’s rule of the creation 
God provides blessings of: fruitfulness, to fill the earth, 
to subdue the earth, and to rule the earth (Genesis 
1:26–30, the construction in Genesis 1:28 “God 
blessed them and said . . .” identifies the content of the 
blessing using a narrative connecter waw consecutive 
as the author repeatedly uses throughout chapter 
1 and elsewhere in Genesis; 8:20–9:17). Ruling the 
earth is both the design goal for we humans and a 
blessing from God (Genesis 1:26, 28). These elements 
of blessing are softer than commands because they 
are within the genre of blessing, which the Blesser, 
God grounds (Genesis 2:3; 5:2; 9:1; 12:2–3). Blessing 
entails a relationship of privilege, mostly guaranteed 
by the blesser in relationship, which in this case is God. 
In this creation context God’s statement accomplishes 
what it says, so these blessings are guaranteed. 
God’s speech in the first literary unit (Genesis 
1–2:4) accomplishes His statement to make it so, 
even though He uses imperatives in these statements 
to render in reality: light, separation, waters, lights 
and swarms (Genesis 1:3, 6, 9, 14, 20). Few would 
conjecture that the imperative in each of these divine 
statements renders light or water culpable for their 
existence, so God incorporates divine statements using 
imperatives in this creation account as statements of 
His guaranteeing the creation order. However, that 
does not guarantee that these spoken creations (light, 
vegetation, and animals) are everywhere, nor does it 
guarantee all humans will be procreatively fruitful. 
Blessing makes it generically realizable for the human 
race, but not necessarily specifically realizable for 
everyone (Genesis 1:22, 28); some may be infertile 
without being culpable for sin concerning this. God 
makes us fruitful, and so corporately we fill the earth. 
God enables us to subdue, so we can rule.  
Though these are God grounded corporate blessings 
there is corporate culpability for involvement indicated 
through the use of imperatives to moral beings. The 
use of plural Hebrew Qal imperatives for all five 
blessings “Be fruitful, multiply, fill, subdue, and 
rule,” and the LXX (Septuagint) having “be fruitful 
and multiply” as present imperatives shows the group 
of humans should as a group participate within the 
corporate blessing which God provides. However, the 
LXX use of “fill, subdue and rule” as aorist indicatives 
softens involvement with these statements of God’s 
guaranteeing the design plan in this text. Perhaps, 
the second century BC LXX perspective of the harm 
accomplished against others through the multiple 
captivities and dispersions diminishes its obligation 
when compared to the Mosaic context of the MT. 
No one is personally culpable if he does not avail 
himself to all blessings. For example, Jesus had the 
blessing of having angel protection (Matthew 4:6), 
but that is no cause for foolish choices. Jesus was 
not culpable for not availing himself with all these 
potential blessings.
God’s blessings can change. For example, the 
blessing of a vegetarian diet changed to include meat 
at the Noahic Covenant (Genesis 1:29–30; 9:2–4).
While God’s corporate blessings in themselves 
are not themselves ethically binding for individuals. 
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However, they can have restrictions within them, so 
there may be aspects of responsibility. When there is 
individual culpability, it is usually spelled out with its 
gain or consequences. For example, gain is apparent 
in that the male and female within image of God 
fosters fruitfulness (Genesis 1:27–28). This would 
have obvious ethical implications for heterosexual 
marriage. Likewise, the Noahic Covenant stipulation 
against murder is immersed within an inclusio 
of blessing, and provided with the teeth of capital 
punishment to enforce its mandate (Genesis 9:1–7). 
As a blessing, fruitfulness to fill is only reiterated 
when the population is small, showing God’s insistence 
on individuals participation in procreation is only 
essential when the population is small (Genesis 1:28; 
9:1, 7).   
So blessing is contextually dependent. Within the 
specific context of family protection and gain from 
labor, children are a blessing from the Lord (Psalms 
127:1–5). This psalm does not declare kids to be a 
blessing in all contexts. For example, a destructive 
foolish son is not a blessing (Proverbs 10:1; 30:11–14). 
So the context of one’s child’s life virtues and vices 
indicates whether a specific child is a blessing for his 
parents or not.
This creation pattern does not legitimate natural 
rights or natural law, but rather God provides the 
privilege of blessings in responsible relationship. We as 
images of God can not insist on a right of the status of 
what we are. That is, an infertile lady can’t insist that 
God make her fruitful. The whole ethical approach 
that defends natural rights or natural law is far more 
indebted to Stoicism, Aristotle, Aquinas and Jefferson 
than to the biblical text. Now don’t misunderstand 
me, there may be truth through natural rights and 
it may be helpful in bilingual communication to other 
worldviews to use natural rights arguments, but 
natural rights and law are not the biblical theology 
framework within which God creates, elects, and 
provides. That is, we images of God must frame our 
ethic by God’s fiat and thus fit into His biblically 
revealed framework for our stewardship. These 
creation frameworks especially develop blessings of: 
fruitfulness, to fill the earth, to subdue the earth, 
and to rule the earth (Genesis 1:26–30; 8:20–9:17). 
Amid these blessings is the stewardship with ethical 
admonitions of: (1) cultivating and keeping the garden 
and then the earth (which has ramifications for 
development, recycling, and retention of resources), 
(2) enjoying the freedom and abundant resources, 
and (3) don’t disobey God or He can judge (Genesis 2: 
15–17; 3:17–19; 8:20–9:17). These ethical frameworks 
have huge ethical ramifications.
Let us briefly explore fruitfulness to fill the earth. 
This blessing is affirmed whenever the population is 
low, so it is a critical admonition in those instances 
(Genesis 1:28; 9:1, 7). Obviously, on an individual 
level fertility can be foregone as a human wishes to 
pursue a noble goal, like a single life of ministry to 
Christ (for example, 1 Corinthians 7). Presumably, 
this would also legitimate family planning so that 
ministry and the quality of child rearing could also 
be facilitated. This is because sexuality is not just for 
procreation but also includes pleasure and cultivating 
a marriage relationship within its purposes (Genesis 
2:23–24; 26:8; Proverbs 30:18–19; SS. 5:1). The 
spilling of Onan’s seed is wrong because he did 
not fulfill his obligation to his sister-in-law/wife in 
levirate marriage (which is designed to raise up a 
family heir for the land [a quality of life concern]); 
it is not a judgment on birth control (Genesis 38: 
8–10; Deuteronomy 25:5–10). This is corroborated by 
Coitus interuptus being permitted by second Temple 
rabbi Eliezer (b. Yebam. 34b; t. Nid. 2.6; Feldman, 
1968, p. 187). However, as a blessing, fertility can not 
be insisted upon as a right. Unfortunately, some will 
be infertile, and there is no sin in this, even if it is 
repeatedly a condition of pain throughout the Bible 
and life. Likewise, there is no sin in attempting to 
comply with God’s broad blessing to become fertile, 
provided it is through ethical means. Fertility can 
be accomplished by a range of enablement’s of each 
spouse (medication, surgery, AID, invitro-fertilization, 
egg donation, cloning) and by adoption from another, 
as well. Additionally, surrogacy is theoretically moral, 
but may be practically difficult to facilitate but it might 
be possible to find a person so generous and giving of 
themselves as to carry a baby to term for the purpose 
of the intended couple to adopt and raise him as their 
own, but it has been done in this generous manner. 
Of course, in a polygamous situation fertility through 
one wife can diminish some felt need of infertility of 
the other, but it rarely meets the psychological need of 
the infertile wife and will likely raise other problems 
since monogamy is God’s design and humans are 
sinful, and of course in many nations polygamy is 
illegal (for example, Genesis 2:24; 16:1–16; 21:8–21; 
29:15–30:24; 1 Samuel 1:2–28). Sometimes God 
will even please the infertile couple with fertility in 
spite of their fertility treatment (for example, Genesis 
30). On this issue, like other infirmed conditions, 
God promises to heal the infertile condition in the 
everlasting Kingdom (Isaiah 54:1–3).   
On the other side of the fertility issue, it would 
be permitted for a society commitment to limit 
population, as in China, because they corporately 
consider that they have “filled” that region of the 
globe. That is, then fruitfulness enables multiplying 
to a full condition through which subduing and ruling 
can be accomplished. Such control that an image 
of God can bring subdues the creation to comply 
with the blessings of God. However, if procreative 
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activity hinders human attempts to rule the creation, 
procreation as a blessing can be limited to facilitate 
the greater purpose and blessing designed for the 
image of God, that of ruling the creation (Genesis 1:26 
purpose over blessing in 1:28 to facilitate purpose).  
Conclusion 
Image of God means “a representation of God” 
showing that God rules here and as a term “image 
of God” identifies that we humans should rule in the 
creation. God sets the purpose of His image to finitely 
rule under God’s sovereignty. As images of God we 
humans are to play god in bio-ethics, doing miniature 
acts of sovereignty under the Sovereign God (Genesis 
1:26–28; 5:1, 3; 9:6; James 3:9). 
Soul
While “image of God” wonderfully elevates 
humanity above the rest of creation, soul connects 
a human with the rest of the creation. That is, the 
language of the Genesis account identifies that 
animals and humans are living souls (Botterweck, & 
Ringgren, 1974–2006, 9:510–516; Genesis 1:20, 24, 
30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980, 
2:589–591; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974, 9:620, 
639–640, 648–649, 653; VanGemeren, 1997, 3:133). 
The animals pre-modernly described as souls are 
non-microbial animals (fish, foul, insect, reptile, 
amphibian, and mammal). No biblical text discusses 
the microbial. Soul has a holistic connotation in 
that it signifies a complete living being (Botterweck 
& Ringgren; Brown, Murphy, & Malony, 1998, 
pp. 22, 178, 186; Dunn, 1998, pp. 76–78; Harris, 
Archer & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974; 
McKenzie, 1965, p. 839; Rahner & Vorgrimler, 1965, 
pp. 442–443; VanGemeren, 1997; Wolff, 1974, pp. 24–
25; 11QTemple 51.19; 54.20; 61.12; 1QS 11.13; CD 
12.11-12; 1QH 2.2, 24; 3.6; 5.17–18; 9.18; 15.16). The 
words for soul, nephesh (npš/   ) in the Hebrew and 
psyche (                              ) in the Greek, have developed from 
the idea of breath to mean the whole person who both 
breathes and desires, lives and moves (Exodus 23:12; 
Deuteronomy 12:12; Brown, 1974, vol. 3, pp. 676, 679). 
Very few biblical references develop “soul” as a part 
of a human (Dunn, 1998; Harris Archer, & Waltke, 
1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974; Pannenberg, 1985, 
p. 523; VanGemeren, 1997; Wolff, 1974), and in those 
cases it refers to the throat or neck, the organ of 
breathing (Isaiah 51:23; Jeremiah 15:9; Luke 2:35; 
Kittle & Friedrich, 1974, 9:609, 618). In other places, 
soul stands in the place of a pronoun, indicating 
living persons (Psalms 54:4; Acts 2:41). At times soul 
is combined in a list with other descriptors of human 
to communicate that all of a person must be involved 
in a task such as loving God (Deuteronomy 6:4–5; 
Matthew 22:32; Acts 4:32; 1 Thessalonians 5:23).  
Only rarely is there a verse like Hebrews 4:12 
which indicates that the Word of God can separate 
between soul and spirit, suggesting the two concepts 
are not identical.  
This biblical concept of soul is very different 
from the philosophical and traditional theological 
alternatives. For example, Tertullian followed the 
Stoics in conceiving of the human soul as corporeal, 
generated with the body (Tertullian, 1869–1870, 
p. 9). Plato reasons that the soul is an eternal form 
for each human which as eternal continues from a 
pre-incarnate existence to a post-incarnate afterlife, 
while our shadowy bodies are birthed and then decay 
(Plato, 1952, pp. 93, 124, 244–246, 763–764). While 
Origen followed Plato’s view of soul (Origen, 1976, 
2.9.6), Augustine modified the concept in the direction 
of neo-platonism, denying eternal pre-existence and 
affirming a created tripartite quality of each human 
soul to reflect the Trinity (Augustine, 1952, pp. 265, 
360–361, 510, 561, 588). In contrast, Aristotle and 
Aquinas proposed a hylomorphic view in which the 
material human is formed as soul (Aristotle, 1952, 
pp. 177, 538, 559, 567, 600, 631, 642–645; Aquinas, 
1952, pp. 14–15, 275–276, 365–367, 368–369, 
378–379, 515). René Descartes proposed a radical 
form of substance dualism in which the soul is akin 
to a thinking substance that is the real person within 
the extended substance of body (Descartes, 1952, 
pp. 20, 135–136, 208–209). Karl Barth identifies that 
body and soul are a “concrete monism,” both terms 
describing the unique and singular experience of 
the person (Barth, 1936–69, 3/2:393). None of these 
philosophical or traditional theological views captures 
the sense of the biblical text and the biblical theology 
movement on the wholistic human concept of soul as 
life or person.
A special contemporary challenge excludes the 
concept of soul from theological discussion by advocating 
humans as nonreductive physicalism. Murphy, Brown, 
and Anderson advocate a nonreductive physicalism 
that considers humans as a “whole complex function, 
both in society and in relation to God, which gives 
rise to ‘higher’ human capacities such as morality and 
spirituality” (Brown, Murphy, & Malony, 1998, p. 2, 
25, 49–72, 99–148). Their view is better analyzed 
as affirming a full concept of body (which I agree 
with) because it actually explores the cognitive and 
religious capacities rooted in embodiement and genes, 
rather than the absence of the presence of soul. Their 
case for nonreductive physicalism excluding soul is 
merely to join Murphy in assuming that their case for 
embodiement excludes soul (perhaps on the basis of 
Ockham’s razor, though this is never mentioned), but 
they marshal no evidence for that assumption. They 
merely assume their conclusion without relevant 




of soul, merely an affirmation of body. Such an 
assumption that redundant analysis and causalities 
exclude each other counters Murphy’s own assumption 
and practice of granting “multiple causation” analyses 
elsewhere (Murphy, 2002; Murphy & Ellis, 1996, 
pp. 195–228). Such a commitment to “multiple 
causation” analysis is a commitment that biblical 
theology’s multifaceted-unity hypothesis of humanity 
here and Murphy elsewhere share in common. 
Additionally, for purposes of informing bio-ethics 
(which is what this chapter is about), Murphy’s 
nonreductive physicalism is a degenerative 
hypothesis, because she nowhere develops the 
concept when she discusses her broadly Christian 
ethic (Murphy & Ellis, 1996; Murphy, Kallenberg, 
& Nation, 1997). So if Murphy ignores nonreductive 
physicalism for discussions in bio-ethics, I will do 
the same. Furthermore, the Bible and the biblical 
theology movement develop “soul” as a meaningful 
concept, showing Murphy has different allegiances 
than inform this paper.
Biblically, soul can be likened to the self or person. 
This concept refers to the most basic or elemental 
aspect of the person. Thus, soul is the relationship 
of the person to himself and others on an ontological 
level. We should not define “person” in a Descartian 
or Lockian manner as a self-aware individual or in 
an Aristotelian manner as having the capacity of 
self-assertion and self-manipulation. This is most 
important in discussions of Trinity and Christology 
where the concept of person and nature must 
be clarified precisely. If nature is defined by the 
attributes of a being, cognition would be an attribute 
related to nature. With such a definition of nature, 
Lockian, Descartian, or Aristotilian definitions for 
“person” would render the Trinity into a contradictory 
concept, affirming three and one mental Beings 
simultaneously (Kennard, 2002, pp. 75–78). In the 
orthodox Trinitarian model, then person is defined 
by the following coherent manner: an instance of a 
spiritual being as a moral end in itself, in relation to 
others. In Trinity there are three persons ontologically 
and one Divine nature. It is the Divine nature that 
is omniscient. In Christology there are two natures 
(Divinity and humanity) and one person Jesus 
Christ. Chalcedon’s decision identified Christ’s Deity 
as omniscient, and humanity as limited and growing 
in knowledge. Thus person and nature are not the 
same thing, nor should they be confused. The divine 
persons are to be worshipped. Whereas, human, 
angelic and animal persons are to be respected to the 
level of their respective natures. That is, while both 
humans and animals are souls, only humans are 
images of God, thus humans are of a higher level of 
being than animals.   
An additional side consequence of defining 
person in a Descartian, Lockian, or Aristotelian 
manner is that infantization and euthanization 
would be advocated. We should not define “person” 
in a Descartian or Lockian manner as a self-aware 
individual because neither a fetus, nor a newly born 
infant can be justified to be self-aware until months 
after birth. Likewise, neither should we define person 
in an Aristotelian manner as having the capacity of 
self-assertion and self-manipulation because such 
capacity does not develop until months after birth. 
Likewise in both definitions a coma victim or a victim 
of only brain-stem functioning would cease to be a 
person and thus could be disposed of as mere tissue. 
The orthodox Trinitarian definition of person protects 
against such infanticide and euthanasia.
On the authority of stipulations and blessings of 
the Noahic covenant: (1) no one should murder (or 
euthanize) a human person, (2) humans and animals 
who do murder (or euthanize) humans should forfeit 
their lives by societal fostered capital punishment, (3) 
humans can eat animals, but not while they are alive, 
and 4) humans should not eat the emblem of soul, the 
blood of the animal (Genesis 9:2–6; Acts 15:20, 29; 
Romans 13:4, 7). No governmental response should 
over-rule the Divinely designated stewardship and 
blessings that are set by God in relationship with 
humans. Therefore, it would be unethical to argue 
that humans have a moral right to die with dignity 
in either natural law or from constitutional rights, 
such as the right to privacy. Furthermore, there is no 
right to limit suffering, but as responsible agents in 
our stewardship under God, we can make attempts 
to diminish pain within suffering, especially when it 
is requested by the responsible agent or the sufferer. 
Quality of life concerns should not be used to over-
rule the divinely sourced stewardship pressed upon 
the human race in toto requiring the communal 
obligation to the right to life.
Likewise, there should be a concern for animal 
privilege in a biblical view of soul. Animals are 
responsible agents and should be rewarded or punished 
appropriately to their level of personhood (Genesis 
3:1, 13–15; 9:5–6; Exodus 21:28–29; Deuteronomy 
25:4; Matthew 12:11–12; Luke 14:5; CD 10:15–11:18 
and especially 11:13–14; 4Q 265; Miscellaneous Roles 
fragment 7, 1.6–9; m. Besa 3.4). However, animals 
are to be subdued and ruled by humans, and even 
eaten (Genesis 1:26–28; 9:2–4). Specifically, animals 
are available for bio-ethical experimentation and 
attempts to improve human conditions. Furthermore, 
it is ethical to use eggs to cultivate human vaccines. 
Drug, cloning and surgery experiments on animals 
are appropriate to develop treatments for humans. 
The bio-ethical concerns would urge against frivolous 
or needlessly painful or wasteful use of these 
animals, because they are souls, and thus persons. 
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To concretize this and to guarantee humans will not 
be accidentally injured, one is justified in spraying 
perfume in the eyes of bunnies.    
Furthermore, in bio-ethics the origin of life is 
the origin of the soul and person. David considers 
that his inward parts (klyty/                   meaning “kidneys” 
or the cognitive center of his being; Wolff, 1974, 
pp. 63–66) and bones were made by God in the womb 
of his mother (Psalms 139:13–15). The continuity 
before birth to growing up to adulthood is considered 
by David to continue to be himself. David considers 
that God has completely planned out his life before 
he had experienced any days of it. Eve recognizes 
that procreation includes the human intimate sexual 
activity and the divine aid to produce a human life 
(Genesis 4:1, 25). So no procreation is without divine 
and human effort to bring it about. David actually 
considers that he began in the heat of intimate sexual 
passion and knowledge (’d‘/     , tmyd/       and thus 
views himself as in the condition of sin from his 
parent’s sexual deed on into his adulthood (Psalms 
51:5; Campbell, 2003, pp. 122–124, 175–177). David 
as fetal soul is already immersed in the depravity 
of sin in the wake of the Fall. Thus, the biblical text 
describes the fetal condition in a pre-modern event 
oriented description as from the sex of conception 
through birth as a continuity of the person after birth, 
and attribute to the unborn personal characteristics 
(such as a sin condition) from the parental sexual 
intercourse on. Likewise, the unborn are even 
called by God before birth (Genesis 25:22–23; 
Judges 13:2–7; Isaiah 49:1, 5; Galatians 1:15).  
Thus abortion is wrong either intentionally or 
unintentionally. Exodus 21:22–24 discusses a relevant 
legal case concerning the unintended consequences of 
striking a pregnant lady. In the striking, “her child” 
(yldyh/        ) is made to “come out” (ys’w/     ) in 
a live birth. That is, ys’w/     always refers to a live 
birth (Genesis 25:25–26; 38:28–30; Jeremiah 1:5; 
26:18), unless it is accompanied by the word “death” 
(mt/     , Numbers 12:12; Job 3:11). So, in this instance 
yld/        refers to a live child, not a miscarriage. There 
is another word for “still birth” in the context but it 
is not used in this instance (škl/, Exodus 23:26; 
Hosea 9:14). Therefore, the baby is born in Exodus 
21:22 prematurely risking her life, so the judges need 
to decide on a fine for the striker, since he put the 
baby at risk in her pre-maturity. That is, if there is 
no further injury to baby or mother then the assessed 
fine is the extent of the punishment. However, if 
the mother or the baby have further injuries, then 
whatever that injury is will be legally meted out 
against the striker. If either the baby or the mother 
dies the abuser forfeits his life (Campbell, 2003, 
pp. 226–227; Exodus 21:23; Middle Assyrian Laws A 
51–53 and Laws Lipit-Ishtar, Laws d–f in Roth, 1995, 
pp. 26–27). Both mother and fetus are treated in this 
passage as persons with legal rights. Therefore, it is 
bio-ethically wrong to abort a fetus for quality of life 
concerns and to intentionally use means that prevent 
fertilized eggs from being implanted (for example, use 
of intra-uterine device or RU486) and birthed. Which 
would mean that in vitro-fertilization would best be 
done without producing any more fertilized eggs than 
used to implant and extra fertilized eggs should be 
utilized with parental consent to help others attempt 
procreation. The fertilized eggs are not property, but 
persons and should not be treated as property. If 
the biological parents consider that they do not wish 
to make further attempts of implantation of eggs 
then these fertilized eggs should not be discarded, 
nor available for stem cell research in a manner 
that destroys them or treatment, but could be made 
available for infertile couples who could benefit by 
such adoptive egg donation. Furthermore, the fact 
that half of the normally fertilized eggs in the normal 
biological process do not implant, neither legitimizes 
abortion, nor frees humans from the responsibility 
to do what is reasonable to facilitate fertilized eggs 
from developing into fully functioning humans to the 
extent that we can. A simpler ethical strategy for in 
vitro-fertilization would be to only fertilize one egg 
per attempt at implantation, because it can side step 
this problem of actual human lives cut short by the 
choice of not trying for implantation. 
Furthermore, a person as soul (npš/) wills, and 
feels hate, love, grief, joy, patience, fear, despair, 
bitterness and sympathy (Isaiah 1:14; Jeremiah 12:7; 
13:17; Job 6:4; 30:25; Psalms 6:3; 35:9; 42:5; Proverbs 
31:6). The continuing legacy of the living self is the soul. 
A person’s emotions and cognitive ability may change 
as she digresses through illnesses like Alzheimer’s or 
dementia or stroke or MS, or brain injury, however 
there is continuity of soul/person there. Finally, 
Revelation 6:9 identifies that the person as soul 
retains life beyond death. Further, in this afterlife, 
such debilitating illnesses are remedied, so that the 
after-life gets beyond these diminishments.  
In an attempt to be bilingual and communicate 
philosophically to other worldviews, human personal 
life may be noticed biologically, to evidence this biblical 
model. (1) Humanness is noticed by the range of human 
DNA in an after conceived and before death condition 
(while normally 46 chromosomes, this permits the 
45 chromosome condition of Turner’s syndrome and 
the 47 chromosome condition of Down’s syndrome 
to also be human). (2) Personal and (3) life can be 
noticed by the fusion of soul/life that biblically begins 
at conception. This personal life may be evidenced by 
noticing the congruence of the properties of growth 
(proceeding through a life cycle including effecting the 










fertilized egg, fusion of DNA with 46 chromosomes, 
and at least in some fertilized eggs the addition of a 
Y chromosome where it had not been there in the egg 
before fertilization), and perhaps self-replication on a 
cellular level. The condition of identical twins would 
also argue for life beginning at conception, when 
the twins are fertilized and the ovum split in two 
(without a sharing of common soul). Of course with 
implantation, there are further changes (stopping the 
woman’s period), and metabolism (cellular and fetal) 
through the mother’s blood stream. In this condition 
the fetus is not like an organ, because bodily organs 
do not eventually have a somewhat independent life 
like children can have. As the fetus goes through the 
life cycle it adds additional qualities which continue 
to increase until puberty (when the person can 
reproduce themself as a full person). So there is more 
evidence biologically for the ontological condition of 
life, as the fetus develops, is birthed and becomes fully 
functioning. Eventually, through menopause (self-
replication) and dementia (irritability and dynamic 
equilibrium) qualities that indicate life may be lost, 
but the ontological person/soul remains. However, this 
biological argument is only an empirical way of noticing 
the deeper biblical ontological reality of the continuing 
soul/life. That is, the observable congruence samples 
some evidence of the deeper issue of the consiliance of 
human personal life. 
Within a person there is the cultivation of his 
awareness of himself as the agent of his own thought 
and behavior (Kierkegaard, 1941). In other words, 
the self relates to the person’s experience of himself, 
without the trappings of social facade or presentation, 
the individual as he stands before himself, as it 
were, psychologically naked. Thus, self as context or 
perspective is the primary personal experience.
The blessing of language acquisition is that humans 
develop a more sophisticated way of conceptualizing 
and having their experience (Wittgenstein, 1953), 
and within validating environments, a sense-of-self 
becomes increasingly under private control. Language 
allows for a temporal perspective on experience and for 
the ability to transcend immediacy-the remembered 
present (Nagel, 1986). Thus ethically, we should 
make our decisions reflect a gradation which prefers 
fostering meaningful personhood, especially in the 
case of conflicting ethical options (Geisler, 1971, 
pp. 114–138, 1989, pp. 113–133; Kierkegaard, 1967). 
That is, in conflicting absolutes (which are rare) 
maximizing personhood (spirituality, relationship, 
and respect) could provide a guide for identifying 
higher norms from lower norms. Namely, Love 
and affirm God (the greatest person) as primary. 
Love and affirm those with whom you have a more 
intimate relationship, for it reflects the degree of trust 
in the covenant (as in marriage) or relationship that 
you have with them. Prefer the household of faith 
and those who foster respect. This sort of orientation 
could even drive a utilitarianism which prefers 
more persons and complete persons over potential 
persons (sperm and non-fertilized egg are potential 
persons and not mere possessions). However, rarely 
do we have to choose one to the exclusion of the other, 
because often ethical absolutes do not in fact conflict 
and with some creativity and faithfulness a way of 
resolution through apparent conflicts can often be 
found. Of course, such gradation does not censure 
self-sacrificing choices, for the others benefit. 
However, humans also have the unique ability 
to over identify with the categories of language 
(for example, husband, lawyer, father) and become 
trapped in contrived experiences that occur only in 
their “mind.” When the contrived experiences are 
associated with dreaded pasts that will not change or 
futures that have not happened, the individual is the 
author of their own distress.
The self or soul, in the context of living, is an 
individual capable of considering his own private and 
public behaviors before, during and after an event. He 
is capable of being mindful of the moment in which he 
is living-his environment, his thoughts and emotions, 
and his potential responses to them. This self-reflective 
being develops public and private behaviors both in 
response to the content of mindfulness and toward 
mindfulness itself. He can train himself to be either 
mindful or mindless in the moment with predictable 
outcomes. Mindlessness or the lack of self-reflective 
behavior leads to impulsive, habitual behaviors on the 
one hand and on the other, via the function of verbal 
behavior, be obsessively “stuck” in catastrophic pasts 
and futures that do not exist at the moment, either of 
which can result in ineffective living. Such mindless 
behavior diminishes consistent ethical thought and 
praxis.
Implicit in the biblical discussion of the soul or 
self is the suggestion that the person can only have a 
self-reflective relationship to himself in context. For 
example, when attempting to empathize with another 
person, an individual will experience increasing 
levels of understanding as he gains more information 
about the context in which the other lives. Thus, the 
self is understood in relationship to one’s awareness of 
one’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors in response to 
one’s environment, both physical and spiritual. This 
has significant implications for the person in terms of 
purpose, meaning and definition.
Conclusion 
The biblical concept of soul entails a wholistic 
meaning of “complete living and willing being” in 
a non-microbial pre-modern manner (for example, 
Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10). Biblically bio-
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ethically humans have a right to life. Those who kill 
a fetus are then culpable of murder and were to be 
killed by capital punishment (Genesis 4:1, 25; Exodus 
21:22–24; Psalm 51:5; 139:13–15; Revelation 6:9). 
Additionally, soul means that animals have certain 
privileges against extremes of bio-ethical abuse.
 
Overall Conclusions
Faced with the near unanimity of biblical 
anthropology among biblical theology (Botterweck 
& Ringgren, 1974–2006; Brown, 1975; Harris. 
Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 
1964–76; VanGemeren, 1997) I propose an analysis 
of the biblical words and concepts, focusing on: (1) 
“image of God” and (2) “soul.” This approach results 
in a functionalism, which I call a multi-faceted unity. 
I propose to extend these biblical theology categories 
into the field of bio-ethics for implications. This 
approach is in contrast to christian bio-ethicists who 
start from the field of philosophy or biology and tack 
some devotional elements of the Bible on the rafters 
of their view.
(1) Image of God means “a representation of 
God” showing that God rules here (Wolff, 1974, 
pp. 160–161; Tell Fekheriye inscription 1, 12, 15–16 in 
Millard & Bordreuil, 1982, p. 137); 4Q504 fragment 
8, lines 4–6 in Wise , Abegg, & Cook,). God sets the 
purpose of His image to finitely rule under God’s 
sovereignty. As images of God we humans are to play 
god in bio-ethics, doing miniature acts of sovereignty 
under the Sovereign God (Genesis 1:26–28; 5:1, 3; 
9:6; James 3:9). 
This legitimates humans attempting prevention 
and recovery means like: ways of controlling pests 
(for example, serpents), aids to diminish pain in 
child birth, pesticides and herbicides, fertilization of 
crops, genetically modified food, inoculations, drug 
and surgery treatment, AID, in vitro-fertilization, 
stem cell treatment, gene therapy, and cloning. Such 
an image of God concept identifies the theoretically 
permissible even though I recognize methodologically 
ethical principles raised elsewhere in the paper bring 
certain restrictions.  
In ruling the creation, anything is permitted 
provided it is: (a) Not excluded by God’s command; that 
is, don’t disobey God or He could judge you (Genesis 
3:17–19; Romans 14:10–12). (b) Anything is permitted 
provided it fits within God’s design parameters and is 
(c) actively engaged in for the Lord’s glory (Romans 
14:6–12). (d) Anything wise is permitted, in that it 
helps and does not hinder (Romans 14:13–15:6). (e) 
Anything is permitted that fits within an affirming 
conscience, rather than violating one’s conscience (a 
New Covenant thing; Romans 14:5, 22–23).
(2) The biblical concept of soul entails a wholistic 
meaning of “complete living and willing being” in 
a non-microbial pre-modern manner (for example, 
Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10). Thus, soul 
means that animals have certain privileges against 
extremes of bio-ethical abuse. 
Biblically bio-ethically humans have a right to life. 
Those who kill a fetus are then culpable of murder 
and were to be killed by capital punishment (Genesis 
4:1, 25; Exodus 21:22–24; Psalm 51:5; 139:13–15; 
Revelation 6:9).  
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